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Metals or Management? Explaining Africa's Recent 
Economic Growth Performance 
By Laura N. Beny and Lisa D. Cook* 
Explanations for Africa's poor long-run 
growth performance have varied over time. The 
theories examined include geography (Jeffrey 
D. Sachs and Andrew Warner 1997); institu 
tions (William Easterly and Ross Levine 1997; 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James 
Robinson 2001, 2002; Nathan Nunn 2007, 
2008); health (David Bloom and Sachs 1998; 
Gregory N. Price 2003); and economic depen 
dency (William Darity 1982). More recently, 
economists have attempted to explain what The 
Economist has called Africa's new "period of 
unparalleled economic success" (The Economist 
2008a, 33). Average annual real GDP growth 
was 1.8 percent between 1980 and 1989 and 
increased to 4.4 percent between 2000 and 
2005. Per head, real growth in Africa fell by 1.1 
percent between 1980 and 1989 and increased 
2.1 percent between 2000 and 2005 (World 
Bank 2007a). This recent reversal of fortune 
may stem from the broad economic reforms that 
many African countries instituted during the 
1990s, especially macroeconomic stabilization 
and financial-market liberalization. But it may 
also be due to the recent boom in international 
prices of oil, copper, and other primary com 
modities that constitute a significant fraction of 
Africa's exports (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 2006). 
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With newly available data extending through 
2005,l we investigate whether international com 
modity price increases (our "metals" hypothesis) 
or policy reforms (our "management" hypoth 
esis) have driven Africa's recent performance. 
In doing so, we supplement existing accounts 
of Africa's recent success (see Benno J. Ndulu 
and Stephen A. O'Connell 2007; John Page 
and Jorge S. Arbache 2008, for example).2 Our 
results, based on cross-country growth regres 
sions, suggest that both "metals" and "man 
agement" have contributed to Africa's recent 
reversal of economic fortune. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section I 
briefly describes our data and methodology. 
Section II presents the results, and Section III 
concludes. 
I. Data and Methodology 
Data on growth in output per capita and other 
country-level characteristics for 239 countries 
are available for the period 1960 to 2005 in the 
World Bank Africa Development Indicators 
(ADI) and World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (World Bank 2007a, b). We supplement 
these data with country-level data from other 
sources. It is possible to use the ADI and WDI 
to explore changes in growth performance in 
African countries before and after the signifi 
cant policy and commodity-export changes in 
the 1990s. We expect both good policy and luck 
to covary with higher rates of economic growth. 
1 These data include the World Bank ADI (World Bank 
2007a). 2 A shortcoming of these accounts is that, while they 
are somewhat informative with respect to the type of eco 
nomic management that is correlated with Africa's recent 
economic performance, they are less informative about 
the type of exports and international trade underlying such 
performance. We address this shortcoming by accounting 
for both export composition and policy in our analyses of 
African growth. 
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In particular, we estimate OLS difference-in 
differences panel models of the form: 
(1) Ayit 
= cx0 + ixAfricax + ^Africa 
x Year 1995it -f- y3metals Africa 
x Year 1995 x metals^ 
+ Xit? + at+?it, 
where Ayit is the half-decadal moving aver 
age growth of GDP per capita for country i in 
year t, ?t is a year dummy, and eit is a random 
error term.3 The elements of X are controls for 
demand and supply of exports?export and 
trade-partner trade-weighted GDP growth from 
Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis (2005); 
the dependency ratio (a demographic factor and 
measure of labor productivity);4 latitude5 from 
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) (2008); an Africa indi 
cator (from the United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database 2008); year dummies 
(1960 is the excluded year); and initial income. 
To test the "metals" hypothesis, metals 
includes each of the following alternative trade 
measures: agricultural exports as a fraction of 
GDP; ore and mineral exports as a fraction of 
GDP; petroleum and petroleum exports as a 
fraction of GDP; and the barter terms of trade. 
We also estimate OLS difference-in-differences 
panel models of the form: 
3 
We build on the cross-country growth regression anal 
yses of Robert J. Barro (1991), Sachs and Warner (1997), 
and Ricardo Hausmann, Jason Hwang, and Dani Rodrik 
(2007), among others. See Jeffrey Wooldridge (2002) for an 
extensive treatment of difference-in-differences estimation. 
While the regressions presented here include half-decadal 
moving averages, models are estimated in the entire sample 
with similar results. Alternative tests, e.g., first-differenc 
ing and generalized least squares (cross-sectional time 
series), were also implemented to control for persistence 
in the data and fixed country effects. The results presented 
in this article are consistent with those using alternative 
specifications. 4 
Other demographic factors, such as life expectancy and 
labor force participation, were used in tests not reported 
here. The inclusion of one set of demographic controls or 
another does not affect the results. 
5 
Due to space constraints, the reported results exclude 
latitude. However, the results are generally the same whether 
we include or exclude latitude from the regressions. 
(2) Ayit 
= a0 + ^Africa-, + ^Africa 
x Year 1995it + ^^management 
x Africa x Fear 1995 
x managementx(q + Xit? 
+ 6t + eit. 
To test the "management" hypothesis, matt 
agement includes each of the following alter 
native measures of macroeconomic policy 
and institutional quality:6 final government 
consumption as a fraction of GDP; the rate of 
inflation (GDP deflator); the black market pre 
mium calculated from end-of-year official and 
black-market exchange rates (from Carmen 
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 2005); and 
the Property Rights Index from the Index of 
Economic Freedom, & measure of the general 
quality of economic management and institu 
tions, particularly the enforcement of laws. 
The coefficients of special interest are those 
on the interaction terms, represented by ? in 
equation (1) and rj in equation (2), which mea 
sure the differential impact of "metals" and 
"management" on economic growth between 
African and non-African countries from 1995. 
II. Results 
The regressions in Table 1 test our "metals" 
hypothesis by including commodity and trade 
variables. All columns present OLS difference 
in-differences estimates. In column 1, the coef 
ficient on the interaction between the Africa 
and 1995 dummies is positive and suggests that 
after the mid-1990s Africa fared relatively bet 
ter than the rest of the world; however, it is not 
significant. In column 2, the coefficients on the 
petroleum export terms are negative, suggestive 
of "Dutch disease" (W. Max Corden and J. Peter 
Neary 1982), but they are insignificant.7 The 
6 
On the significance of institutions to Africa's economic 
performance, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 
2002), Price (2003), and Nunn (2007, 2008). 7 
In unreported OLS random effects regressions, we find 
that the coefficient on exports of petroleum and related prod 
ucts relative to GDP is negative and significant. However, 
in the same regression, the coefficient on the interaction of 
this measure with exports of goods and services as a frac 
tion of GDP is positive and significant. This result suggests 
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Table 1?"Metals" (Commodity Boom) Tests: Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
(Dependent variable: GDP growth, per capita, 1960-2005) 




Export growth, annual 
percent 
Africa dummy 
GDP per capita in 1960, 
(current USD) 
Year = 1995 
Exports, agricultural raw 
materials, percent GDP 
Exports, ores and minerals, 
percent GDP 
Exports, petroleum and 
petroleum products, percent GDP 
Terms of trade, 2000 = 100 
Africa dummy x 1995 
Africa dummy x 1995 x petroleum 
exports, percent GDP 
Africa dummy x 1995 x ore 
exports, percent GDP 
Africa dummy x 1995 x terms of 
trade 
Africa dummy x 1995 x 



















































































Notes: Standard errors robust to clustering are reported below estimated coefficients. All models are estimated as difference 
in-differences OLS models. Year dummies are included, but only the coefficient for the 1995 year dummy is reported. An 
intercept term is also included in estimation but is not reported. Variable definitions and sources are given in text. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
negative and significant coefficient on ore and 
mineral exports relative to GDP in column 3 is 
also consistent with Dutch disease. By contrast, 
the coefficient on the interaction between ore 
and mineral exports and the Africa and 1995 
that, while exporting petroleum alone is negatively corre 
lated with economic growth (again suggestive of Dutch dis 
ease), exporting these products in conjunction with goods 
and services, i.e., export diversification, is positively cor 
related with economic growth (see, for example, Ndulu and 
O'Connell 2007; IMF 2006). 
dummies in column 3 are positive and signifi 
cant, which supports our "metals" hypothesis 
for Africa. In column 4, the coefficient on the 
terms of trade is negative and significant, as 
expected, while the coefficient on the interaction 
between this variable and the Africa and 1995 
dummies is insignificant. Finally, the regression 
in column 5 broadly supports our commodities 
boom hypothesis in that the coefficient on the 
interaction among 1995, Africa, and agricul 
tural exports as a fraction of GDP is positive 
and significant. The recent commodities boom 
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Table 2?"Management" (Policy) Tests: OLS and Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
(Dependent variable: GDP growth, per capita, 1960-2005) 
Regressor (i) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependency ratio 
Trade-partner growth, annual percent 
Export growth, annual percent 
Africa dummy 
GDP per capita in 1960, 
(current USD) 
Year = 1995 
Government spending, percent GDP 
Inflation rate 
Black market premium 
Property rights 
Africa dummy x 1995 
Africa dummy x 1995 x government 
spending, percent GDP 
Africa dummy x 1995 x inflation rate 
Africa dummy x 1995 x black 
market premium 






















































































Notes: Standard errors robust to clustering are reported below estimated coefficients. All models are estimated as difference 
in-differences OLS models. Year dummies are included, but only the coefficient for the 1995 year dummy is reported. An 
intercept term is also included in estimation but is not reported. Variable definitions and sources are given in text. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
in Africa affected both petroleum and mineral 
and nonpetroleum and nonmineral primary 
commodity exports (IMF 2006), so this result 
is not surprising. 
The regressions presented in Table 2 exam 
ine our "management" hypothesis by adding 
policy measures. All columns present OLS dif 
ference-in-differences regressions. In column 
2, while the coefficient on government spend 
ing is negative and significant, the coefficient 
on the interaction of government spending and 
the Africa and 1995 dummies is positive and 
significant. This result suggests that after 1995 
government spending in Africa may have aided 
in increasing living standards relative to prior 
years and other countries, possibly a reflection 
of more productive spending by African govern 
ments, e.g., on health and infrastructure, which 
is correlated with productivity and economic 
growth (see also Sachs and Warner 1997). In 
column 3, the positive and significant coef 
ficient on the interaction among inflation and 
the Africa and 1995 dummies likely reflects the 
fact that higher rates of inflation were correlated 
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Table 3?"Metals" versus "Management": Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
(Dependent variable: GDP growth, per capita, 1960-2005) 
Regressor (i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependency ratio 
Trade-partner growth, annual 
percent 
Export growth, annual percent 
Africa dummy 
GDP per capita in 1960, 
(current USD) 
Year = 1995 
Government spending 
Africa dummy x 1995 
x government spending 
Exports, agricultural raw 
materials, percent GDP 
Africa dummy x 1995 
x agricultural exports, 
percent GDP 
Exports, ores and minerals, 
percent GDP 
Africa dummy x 1995 x ore 
exports, percent GDP 
Inflation rate 
Africa dummy x 1995 
x inflation rate 
Black market premium 

































































































































Notes: Standard errors robust to clustering are reported below estimated coefficients. All models are estimated as OLS 
models. Year dummies are included, but only the coefficient for the 1995 year dummy is reported. Variable definitions and 
sources are given in text. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
with economic growth in African countries. In 
other words, a greater part of price increases 
in Africa after 1995 may have been the "good" 
inflation that accompanies economic growth. 
Similarly, the result in column 4 implies that the 
impact of the black market premium was more 
benign in Africa after 1995 relative to other 
countries. Finally, the property rights measures 
in column 5 are insignificant, possibly a result of 
insufficient observations. 
Table 3 presents results from testing the "met 
als" and "management" hypotheses simultane 
ously. Commodity and trade variables include 
mineral and ore exports and agricultural exports, 
relative to GDP. Policy variables include gov 
ernment spending, the inflation rate, and the 
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black market premium. In columns 1 and 2 
"management" dominates "metals." The coeffi 
cients on the terms interacted with government 
spending positively and significantly covary with 
economic growth, whereas the terms interacted 
with mineral and agricultural exports are not sig 
nificant at conventional levels. "Management" 
and "metals" in column 3 are both significant; 
specifically, the coefficients on both the inflation 
and agriculture interaction terms are positive 
and significant. However, the coefficient on the 
former is of larger magnitude than the coefficient 
on the latter. In column 4, the "management" 
effect clearly dominates the "metals" effect. In 
particular, the coefficient on the inflation inter 
action term is positive and significant, while the 
coefficient on the ore and minerals interaction 
term is insignificant (albeit positive). 
When considering the black market premium 
in columns 5 and 6, neither "metals" nor "man 
agement" consistently dominates. The coeffi 
cient on the black market premium interaction 
term remains positive and significant at the 1 
percent level of significance. At the same time, 
the coefficients on the interacted commodity 
variables are highly significant. For agricultural 
exports (column 5), it is less clear which effect 
is larger since the coefficients are approximately 
the same size. With respect to ore and mineral 
exports (column 6), the magnitude of the coeffi 
cient on its interaction term is one order of mag 
nitude larger than that on the premium variable. 
Overall, the results in Table 3 are generally 
consistent with the findings in the separate 
"management" and "metals" regressions. It is 
difficult to conclude decisively whether policy 
reforms or commodity-price fluctuations have 
been more influential with respect to Africa's 
recent growth spurt. Rather, it seems that both 
have mattered. 
III. Conclusion and Future Research 
We have exploited recently available data 
on African economic growth to understand 
whether policy reform ("management") or 
the recent commodity boom ("metals") bet 
ter explains Africa's recent growth experience. 
Our results suggest that both factors have con 
tributed to Africa's recent reversal of fortune. 
These findings are broadly consistent with those 
in the related empirical literature. We believe 
this study is timely and important. Commodity 
booms are typically followed by commodity 
busts, as demonstrated by the IMF (2006). If bet 
ter economic management has played any posi 
tive role, it may be critical for protecting gains 
in growth outcomes and higher living standards 
when commodity prices eventually fall. 
While we have been careful to minimize 
problems associated with using country-level 
data in estimation, we are aware of the limita 
tions of cross-country regression analysis, such 
as reverse causation, multicollinearity, and 
heterogeneity.8 Given the resulting problems 
of interpretation, future research may include 
country case studies to circumvent such prob 
lems and corroborate our results. It would also 
be interesting to revisit our "management" and 
"metals" tests a few years hence, after the cur 
rent global financial and economic crises have 
evolved and once data are available (see also 
The Economist 2008b). 
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